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Introduction 1/ 
The relationship between Japan and Brazil i s quite interwoven 
since Japanese immigrant society of 800 000 resides in Brazil. 
Trade between two countries reached US$2 945 million (exports to 
Brazil, US$1 367 million and imports from Brazil, US$1 578 
million) in 1981, an increase of 10% over 1980. Japanese 
o f f i c i a l economic assistance to Brazil amounted to 44 875 million 
yen, approximately US$163 million, (grants: 36 million yen, and 
yen-denominated loans: 44 839 million yen) up to 1982. Private 
financial assistance to Brazil totalled US$7 052 million up to 
1981, in which direct overseas investment accounted for 46% (US$ 
3 224 million) and deferred payment exports for 54% (US$3 828 
million). In addition, the Export-Import Bank of Japan, a 
Government financial institution, financed exports to Brazil as 
buyer's credits, totalling 233 b i l l i o n yen, approximately US$585 
million on the commitment base up to the end of 1982 2/. 
In this paper, Japan's direct overseas investment in Brazil 
w i l l be analyzed. The post-war Japan's overseas investment began 
in 1951. Its accumulated amount to Brazil (US$3 545 million) 
during the 1951-1952 period occupied the third place following 
the United States and Indonesia. Japanese investments in Brazil 
have concentrated in such sectors as iron and steel, textiles, 
general machinery and commerce. 
The f i r s t section provides an overall view of Japan's direct 
overseas investment. In the next section, the investment in 
Brazil w i l l be examined according to the Brazilian economic 
development stages. In the third section, the present situation 
of Japan's investment in Brazil w i l l be summarized. Then, some 
cases of Japanese business failures and successes w i l l be 
analyzed in the fourth section, and f i n a l l y , comments w i l l be 
made on the business interaction between Japan and the United 
States with respect to foreign investments in Brazil. 
1. An overall view of Japan's direct overseas investment 
Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (the 
Foreign Exchange Law, hereafter) defines the direct overseas 
investment as (1) purchasing stocks and debenture bonds of 
foreign companies, (2) acquisition of obligative rights and 
extension of long-term loans to the companies whose capital i s 
possessed by the action of (1), and (3) payments for 
establishment of branches, factories and representative offices 
in foreign countries. The law was modified in December 1980 and 
Japanese capital shares for direct investment was changed from 
over 25% to over 10% stocks of a foreign corporation. Before the 
modification, the following were applied: the possession of 
raore-than-25% and in the case of more-than-10% but less than 25% 
with conditions that (1) dispatching managerial staff, (2) 
t r a n s f e r r i n g manufacturing technologies, (3) supplying raw 
materials, (4) purchasing f i n a l products, (5) assisting 
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financially, (6) having agent contracts and (7) establishing 
lasting economic relationships with the invested company. The 
Foreign Exchange Law was f i r s t established in 1951, six years 
after the cease-fire of World War II and Japan's direct overseas 
investment restarted. But i t was quite limited due to the 
scarcity of foreign exchange and the authorized basis by the 
Ministry of Finance. since 1969 the law has gradually been 
liberalized in accordance with the rapid expansion of Japan's 
participation to world economies. The pace of liberalization 
accelerated during the 1970's and after five modifications, 
d i r e c t investment abroad became, in p r i n c i p l e , t o t a l l y 
liberalized in December 1980. 
The law now only requires a prior notification to the 
Central Bank by the investor. However, there are several 
exceptions. For example, some sectors are prohibited to invest 
or need to have an approval of the Finance Minister. Those 
sectors are: banking and investment, fishery (in particular, 
areas based on the International Fishing Treaty), leather 
industry, textiles, oyster farming to produce pearls, arms and 
narcotics production. Such regions as South Africa and Namibia 
are also closed to invest. Investment less than 3 million yen 
(approximately US$13 000) and a purchasing of real estate do not 
require a notification to the Central Bank. 
Japan's early direct overseas investment were directed to 
the United States to set up commercial links to s e l l Japanese 
products and import US commodities. Trading companies opened 
their branches or established local entities in the United 
States. In Asia, the investment in mining development had been 
emphasized up to the mid 1950's. For example, investments were 
made in the Goa iron ore mine in India. Up to 1965 investment in 
manufacturing industries gradually became active in Asia and 
Latin America. Three big projects were launched by the strong 
support from the Japanese Government to demonstrate Japanese 
technology and to prove a rebirth of the industrial success of 
the post-war period. Those were: the Alaskan pulp project 
(1953); the Brazilian steel project (USIMINAS, 1957); and the 
Arabian o i l project (1958). Import substitution policies adopted 
by Latin American countries during the 1950's induced Japanese 
investments in this region, for the purpose of defending market 
shares. 
From the mid I960's to the f i r s t o i l shock in 1973, the 
Japanese economy achieved a very high growth. It increased at an 
average annual rate of 10% in real terms between 1964 and 1973. 
The current balance of payments showed a surplus every year from 
1964 to 1972 vrith an exception of 1967, and the Japanese foreign 
exchange reserve 3/ rose rapidly. This led the Government to 
li b e r a l i z e Japan's direct overseas investment. The f i r s t measure 
to decontrol part of the Foreign Exchange Law was adopted in 
October 1969 and successive liberalizations followed: the second 
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in September 1970; the third in July 1971; and the fourth in June 
1972. These measures, combined with the yen appreciation 
following the Nixon shock in August 1971, which was responsible 
for the yen f l o a t a t i o n , induced Japan's direct overseas 
investment to spurt. 
In addition, the system of foreign currency loans was 
instituted in 1972 and the law of the Export-Import Bank of Japan 
was modified in the same year to strengthen i t s overseas 
investment credit operation. Moreover, corporations were 
permitted to make provisions for losses on overseas investments 
as one of the special tax measures. These measures accelerated 
Japanese overseas investment, especially during the 1972-1973 
period. Annual overseas investment amounted to US$2 338 million 
in 1972 as compared with US$858 million in 1971, and reached US$3 
494 million in 1973 on the notification basis. 
Due to the o i l c r i s i s , overseas investment decreased in 1974 
but i t soon recovered in 1975 to reach a level over US$3 b i l l i o n . 
The f i f t h liberalization measure was instituted in April 1978 and 
during the 1978-1980 period the annual average exceeded US$4.5 
b i l l i o n . After 1980, investment to industrialized countries such 
as the United States of America and the United Kingdom increased 
in order to avoid trade frictions. 
From the restart of overseas investment to 1982, the total 
cumulative amount on the notification basis reached US$53 131 
million with 29 063 investment cases (see Table 1). The 
cumulative investment between 1971 and 1982 was fourteen times 
larger than that of between 1951 and 1970. This indicates that 
Japan's direct overseas investment i s quite a recent phenomenon 
and, as compared with Western countries, Japan i s a late-comer in 
the international investment scene. Japan has not yet come to 
the point to enjoy investment benefits and, therefore, has not 
achieved high reinvestment ratio. It i s also worth mentioning 
that the average investment per case has been increasing, 
suggesting that new investments cost more than before even after 
taking into account of inflation. 
Out of the total value invested between 1951 and 1982, as a 
major host country, the United States of America accounted for 
26.3% while Indonesia followed with a 13.7% share. Brazil was 
the third largest recipient with a 6.7% contribution, amounting 
to US$3 545 million (Latin America in the aggregate accounted for 
17%). Australia (5.4%) came next and the United Kingdom (4.3%) 
took the f i f t h place (see Table 2). 
In the context of industrial sectors invested during the 
same period, manufacturing accounted for 32% of the total 
cumulative amount, in which iron and nonferrous metals were the 
biggest single industry, contributing 6.8% of the total. 
Chemicals were the second biggest among the manufacturing 
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industries with a 6.0% share. Predominance of these sectors 
reflected the fact that Japan searched for resource-based 
industries abroad. Electric and electronic machinery (4.4%) 
followed and transportation machinery (3.4%) came next. In these 
cases, the Japanese industrialists wanted to expand or defend 
market shares. The mining sector accounted for 19.4% reflecting 
Japan's scarcity of natural resources. Investments in commerce 
contributed 16.0% to the total due to the high dependency of the 
Japanese economy on foreign trade. 
Reasons for the rapid expansion of Japan's direct overseas 
investment are summarized as follows: 
(i) Japan's economic acti v i t i e s depend substantially on 
foreign countries. Japan has to import raw materials and after 
processing raw materials into manufacturing goods, those final 
goods are to be exported to foreign markets. Thus, to secure raw 
materials by imports through resource development investments i s 
v i t a l to Japan. The Japanese economy has become more raw 
material dependent. 
(ii) Manufacturing investments are principally intended to 
maintain or expand the market share in the invested region but 
cost elements such as cheap labor and low material costs in the 
region are also important considerations. As industrialization 
proceeds, production costs increase so that i t i s more 
advantageous to construct factories in a country where those 
inputs are cheaper. Commerce and banking investments followed 
hand in hand with manufacturing investments to serve the latter 
and functioned to expand trade and financial flows between Japan 
and the invested regions. 
( i i i ) Some Governments of developing countries provided 
incentives for foreign investment like tax heaven and export 
subsidies. In particular, the establishment of free trade zones 
induced not only the Japanese but also other industrial 
countries' investments (for example, Kaohsiung in Taiwan was 
assigned as one in 1965, Manaus in Brazil in 1967, Mariveles in 
the Philippines in 1970, Masan in Korea in 1970 and Bayan Lepas 
in Malaysia in 1971). 
(iv) Recently, Japan has invested in advanced countries such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom to avoid trade 
fri c t i o n s . The new phenomenon contradicts the product-cycle 
hypothesis but in order not to invite global protectionism Japan 
i s willing to invest in such countries. 
(v) The yen appreciation vis-a-vis the major currencies, in 
particular, the US dollar after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
regime, helped Japan to invest overseas since investment costs 
became relatively low in terms of yen. 
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(vi) Needless to say that the step-by-step liberalization of 
overseas investment laws and other related incentives provided by 
the Japanese Government favoured Japan's investment abroad. 
2. Japan's direct investment to Brazil 
Japan's direct investment to Brazil can be divided into four 
stages: (a) before 1950; (b) 1951-1963; (c) 1964-1973; and (d) 
after 1974. This classification corresponds to the stages of the 
Brazilian economic development. As has already been mentioned, 
Japan's post-war direct overseas investment was initiated in 
1951. Japanese economic activities in Brazil before that time 
were related to those of Japanese immigrants. In the 1950's 
Brazil began to undertake i t s industrialization. In 1952 CDI 
(Conselho do Desenvolvimento Industrial) was formed to promote 
industrialization and in the same year BNDE (Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento Económico) was set up to finance long-term 
development p r o j e c t s . One of the most ambitious 
industrialization plans was executed by President J. Kubitschek 
(1956-1960). The plan, called Programa de Metas (1957-1961), 
aimed at establishing basic industries and infrastructures. The 
plan was mainly based on import substitution policies. Steel, 
automotive, shipbuilding and machinery industries as well as 
construction of roads and electric power were emphasized as major 
areas for development. 
After the 1964 coup d'etat, the military Government took 
pragmatic economic policies and an economic boom arrived. The 
Brazilian economy grew at an average annual rate of 11.5% in real 
terms during the 1968-1973 period. The Government welcomed 
foreign investments and manufacturing industries grew very 
rapidly. In 1967 Manaus was assigned as a free trade zone and 
SUFRAMA (Superintendencia da Zona Franca de Manaus) was founded 
to administer the zone. 
Brazil suffered heavily from the o i l price increase in 1973 
since the country had to import approximately 80% of petroleum 
requirements. The balance of payments, in particular the trade 
balance deteriorated significantly since then. Export promotion 
was, thus, urgently needed. Under the Geisel administration 
several large-scale investment projects came to the front in 
order to export Brazilian goods. Foreign investments were geared 
to export promotion. The second o i l shock in 1979 and the 
following world recession urged further Brazil to earn foreign 
exchange. 
(a) Before 19'50 
In 1908, the f i r s t emigrant boat from Japan, "Kasato-maru", 
arrived at the Port of Santos. From that time to 1941, Japanese 
emigration to Brazil amounted to 188 986 persons 4/« They were 
almost agricultural laborers. They worked f i r s t as a contract 
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laborer, called colono, in coffee plantations and after their 
contract terminated, later became engaged in agriculture, 
especially vegetable and f r u i t production. They contributed 
greatly to the Brazilian agricultural development and became the 
largest suppliers of perishables, in particular, to the Sao Paulo 
metropolis 5/» 
One Japanese emigrant introduced an agricultural cooperative 
society to Brazil in 1927. This was the embryo of COTIA 
(Cooperativa Agrícola de Cotia), which i s now the biggest 
cooperative society in Latin America. COTIA has 8 806 members 
and i t s gross sale amounted to Cr$34 523 million (about US$272 
million) in 1981. Balanço Anual of 1981, edited by Gazeta 
Mercantil 6/ ranked COTIA at 104th in the 300 major local 
industrial groups in Brazil in terms of net assets. To finance 
business of Japanese-Brazilian farmers. Casa Bancaria Bratac was 
founded in 1937 by two Japanese-Brazilians. This was reorganized 
to be Banco America do Sul S.A. in 1947. i t grew to a banking 
conglomerate and was placed at 97th in the same ranking by Gazeta 
mercantil. 
Japanese companies in Brazil before 1950, therefore, were 
b a s i c a l l y engaged in the acti v i t i e s related to Japanese-
Brazilians. In those days, their economic population i s now 
estimated around 800 000 , the largest collection of ethnic 
Japanese outside Japan. 
(b) The period from 1951 to 1963 
During the 1950's Brazil put emphasis on industrialization 
based on import substitution policies. The Government invited 
foreign capital to develop heavy industries. In the Metas Plan 
they aimed particularly at establishing several heavy industries 
like automotive, shipbuilding and steel production. GEIA (Grupo 
Executivo da Industria Automobilística) was set up in 1956 to 
boost car manufacturing. Such automobile makers as Ford, General 
Motors and Volkswagen applied for the project. From Japan TOYOTA 
took part but only for production of the land cruiser. 
In the case of shipbuilding, GEICON (Grupo Executivo da 
Industria de Construção Naval) a Government promoting body, 
planned to establish the shipbuilding industry in Brazil in 1958. 
Holland (Verolme) and Japan (ISHIKAWAJIMA-HARIMA Heavy Industries 
Co.) participated in the project. Ishikawajima do Brazil-
Estaleiros S.A. (Ishibreas) was founded in 1959 and started to 
construct a shipbuilding yard in Rio de Janeiro. This was the 
f i r s t shipbuilding site constructed outside Japan (Ishibras can 
now build tankers of more than 275 000 DWT, the largest dry-dock 
capacity in Latin America). 
Steel production was planned to increase i t s output from 1.2 
million tons in 1955 to 2.3 million tons in 1966. The two state-
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owned steel mills, Cosipa and Usiminas, were to be oonstructed. 
Japan took part in the latter as a joint partner with a 40% 
capital share in 1957. Usiminas steel plant was an epoch-making 
project for the growing Japanese economy. Japan wanted to 
demonstrate i t s industrial power to the world after recovering 
from devastation of World War II. Both the Government and the 
private business circles supported the project as a prototype of 
Japan's plant exports. First, a mill with the production 
capacity of 500 000 tons per year of crude steel was founded in 
1963 at Ipatinga in the State of Minas Gerais (the capacity has 
expanded after the three-phase expansion program to 3.5 million 
tons up to 1982). 
ABDIB (Associação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento das 
Industrias de Base) in i t s 1979 Annual Report cites 104 member 
companies among which 6 were founded in the 1930's, 18 in the 
1940's, 31 in the 1950's, 17 in the 1960's, 17 in the 1970's and 
15 before 1930. This implies that basic industries received high 
pr i o r i t y during the 1950's. 
In this period two other types of investment from Japan were 
also important;: one was loans from Japanese emigrant farmers and 
the other investment for textiles. The former was lending 
operations to Japanese farmers in Brazil to support their 
agricultural a c t i v i t i e s . 
Japanese textile industry began to invest in Latin America 
during the last half of the 1950's. Up to i960 the Central Bank 
of Japan had a foreign exchange quota for the importation of raw 
cotton. This caused tight supply of cotton in Japan. Therefore, 
spinners, fearing limited supply of raw cotton, wanted to invest 
directly in cotton producing regions. Cotton yarn producers 
established a f f i l i a t e d companies or formed joint-venture 
companies in Brazil in succession: TOYOBO (1965), KANEBO (1956), 
UNITIKA (1958) and TSUZUKI (1960). Combining with OMIKENSHI 
(1973), Japanese cotton yarn producers in Brazil grew to have a 
shipment share of 45% from the Santos Port up to the late 1970's. 
Direct investments in machinery were also made and such 
a c t i v i t i e s included Cbc (Japanese parent company being MITSUBISHI 
Heavy Industries) for heavy machines in 1955, Howa (HOWA 
Machinery) for spinning and weaving machines in 1956 and Yanmar 
(YANMAR Diesel) for Diesel engines and agricultural machines in 
1957. At the same time, major trading companies opened their 
offices in Brazil as follows: MARUBENI (1955); MITSUBISHI 
(1955); C. ITCH (1957); and MITSUI (1960). To sum up, this 
period constituted the f i r s t boom of Japanese investment to 
Brazil. From 1951 through 1961, the accumulated investment 
amounted to US$199 million. 
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(C) The period from 1964 to 1973 
The military regime introduced the monetary correction 
system (indexation) and reformed f i s c a l and monetary structures. 
Finance was geared to longer-term development projects. These 
pragmatic reorganization brought about an economic boom, called 
"Brazilian miracle", and manufacturing sectors expanded quickly. 
The share of industrial sectors (including mining) to the total 
national income increased from 30% in 1960 to 35% in 1970 while 
during the same period, that of agriculture declined from 20% to 
11%. Liberal policies of the Government towards foreign capital 
accelerated investment from abroad. Japan's investment to Brazil 
increased continuously, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
The Manaus free trade zone, which was assigned in 1967, attracted 
Japanese investments. In the zone, companies could obtain 
several benefits like tax exemption on import duties and 
industrial product tax (IPI), etc. The exemption from import 
duties for imported parts was a substantial factor which Japanese 
companies exploited. Such products, which are standardized but 
require high (quality, as high f i d e l i t y radios, color T.V.'s and 
motorcycles f i t t e d to the free-zone operation. Japanese electric 
and electronic makers established joint-venture companies with 
Brazilian partners and constructed factories in the zone. For 
example, SANYO set up a color T.V. factory with Pereira Lopez; 
TOSHIBA with Semp; SHARP with Sharp S.A.; MITSUBISHI with Evadin 
and MATSUSHITA with Springer. HONDA Motor Co. established an 
a f f i l i a t e d company in Sao Paulo in 1971 which ten set up a 
factory (Motor Honda Amazonia) in the zone. Not only Japanese 
but investors from other Western countries also invested in the 
area and up to 1973, 219 manufacturing companies were set up. 
The growth of the manufacturing sectors stimulated 
investments in financial sectors as well. Three Japanese banks 
were authorized to run banking business in Brazil. Those were: 
Banco Mitsubishi Brasileiro S.A., Banco Sumitomo Brasileiro S.A. 
and Banco de Tokyo S.A. The MITSUBISHI Bank entered Brazil in 
1934 while the Bank of TOKYO in 1956 and the SUMITOMO Bank in 
1958. Other Japanese banks followed to establish representative 
o f f i c e s or to make a capital participation in Brazilian 
investment banks. The DAI-ICHI KANGYO Bank participated in 
Unibanco with a 10% share in 1972, the INDUSTRIAL Bank of Japan 
in Banco Finansa de Investimento with a 10.3% share in 1973 and 
the MITSUI Bank in BAnco Investimento de Bozano Simonsen in 1973. 
The FUJI Bank established a representative office in Sao Paulo in 
1974 and participated in Banco America do Sul with a 14% share 
and in other a f f i l i a t e d companies of the Banco America do Sul 
group. Since 1974 some other Japanese banks and insurance 
companies have rushed to enter the Brazilian financial market. 
From Japan's point of view, the Tax Agreement between Brazil 
and Japan played an important for Japanese investment 7/. The 
Agreement was signed in January 1967 (effective from January 1, 
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1968) and intended to prevent double taxation on Japanese 
companies. The Agreement was modified in March 1976 (effective 
from January 1, 1978). Under the new Agreement, rates of the 
withholding tax on the remittance of Japanese companies were 
fixed as follows: 
Dividend payments 12.5% (prior to the Agreement: 25%) 
Interest payments 12.5% (prior to the Agreement: 25%) 
Fees on trademarks 25.0% (prior to the Agreement; 25%) 
Fees on copyright of 
movies & T.V. films 15.0% (prior to the Agreement; 40%) 
Royalties 12.5% (prior to the Agreement; 25%) 
High economic growth and bright expectation for the strong 
domestic demand in B r a z i l , combined with the successive 
liberalization of overseas investment laws in Japan, led to the 
second investment boom of 1973. The number of investment 
applications increased from 93 cases in 1972 to 197 in 1973 and 
the amount totalled US$435 million in 1973 as compared with 
US$169 million in the previous year (see figure 1). The flow of 
investment to Brazil in 1973 accounted for 12% of the total 
Japanese overseas direct investment flows. The accumulated 
investment to Brazil from 1951 through 1973 amounted to US$1 014 
million, of 9.9% of the total Japanese investments overseas. 
(d) The period from 1974 to the present 
The f i r s t o i l c r i s i s was detrimental to the Brazilian 
economy since the country had to import about 80% of the 
petroleum consumption. The trade balance recorded a significant 
d e f i c i t consecutively from 1974 to 1980 except 1977. The Geisel 
administration put emphasis on export promotion and import 
controls in order to reduce the trade d e f i c i t and to repay for 
the accumulated external debts. Import control measures 
included; promotion of local contents; the regulation of national 
similar goods (1966); advance deposits of imports (1975) ; and an 
import ban of unnecessary products (1976). Exports were 
encouraged through already existing measures. Starting from 
1964, the military Government has gradually shifted their import 
substitution policies to export promotion. Benefits for export 
industries during the I960's are summarized as follows; draw-
back system (1964); exemption of IPI (1964) and commodity 
transaction tax (ICM, 1967); tax credit system of IPI (1964) and 
ICM (1971); corporation tax exemption (1965) ; financial tax 
exemption (1966); the system of export credit insurance (1965) 
and export credit fund (FINEX, 1966). The Government adopted the 
crawling-peg system in 1968. For the manufacturing exports, 
BEFIEX (Beneficios Fiscais a Programas Especiais de Exportação) 
played an important role. The program was established in 1972 
and i t permitted export industries to import machines and parts 
with the application of reduced t a r i f f rates, provided that the 
export schedule of their products for coming ten years to be 
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authorized and the concession import value would not exceed one 
third of the annual export value. Exports under the program 
reached 8.2% of the total Brazilian exports in 1978. 
President Geisel propelled large-scale projects such as 
Itaipu and Tucurui hydroelectric projects, Camacari petrochemical 
complex, Rio de Janeiro subway construction, nuclear power 
development, o i l exploration and alcohol projects. For example, 
the Camacari project was to construct the second petrochemical 
complex in Brazil following the Cubatao petrochemical center in 
Sao Paulo. Its construction started in 1970 to produce ethylene 
and the related chemical products, with the ethylene capacity of 
388 000 tons per year. In 1978 the complex came into operation. 
One of the a f f i l i a t e d companies of Petrobras, called Petroquisa, 
set up Copene (Petroquímica do Nordeste S.A.) to run the 
operation and about 40 companies organized joint-ventures with 
Petroquisa. Several Japanese chemical corporations and trading 
companies took part in these joint-ventures. Examples include: 
Ciguine 
(Cia. Petroquímica S.A.) -MITSUBISHI Chemical Industries 
and NISSHO-IWAI (Total Japanese 
capital share: 33.76% in 1981) 
(Established in 1969) 
Copenor 
(Cia. Petroquímica do Nordeste) 
-MITSUBISHI GAS Chemical Co. and 
MARUBENI (Toal Japanese capital 
share: 25% in 1981) 
(Established in 1971) 
-MITSUBISHI Chemical Industrial and 
NISSHO-IWAI (Total Japanese capital 
share: 33.32% in 1981) 
(Established in 1974) 
-SUMITOMO Chemical Co. and C. ITOH 
(Total Japanese capital share: 30% 
in 1981) 
(Established in 1974) 
Cpc (Cia. Petroquímica Camacari) 
-MITSUBISHI Chemical Industries and 
NISSHO-IWAI (Total Japanese capital 
share: 33.3% in 1981) 
(Established in 1975) 
In September 1976, President Geisel visited Tokyo and the 
joint-communique between Japan and Brazil was issued. The 
communique included the following projects to be carried out 
join t l y by both parties: (a) cellulose project at Ipatinga; (b) 
Polialden Petroquímica S.A. 
Politeno Ind. e Com. S.A. 
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Amazon aluminum project; (c) Cerrado agricultural project; and 
(d) Tubarão steel project. These projects were satisfactory to 
the two Governments since Brazil wanted to export these products 
to earn foreign exchange as well as to substitute i t s imports, 
while Japan weinted to have stable supply of semi-finished goods 
such as bleached short-fiber pulp, aluminum, and slab. The 
Japanese business circles participated in the projects together 
with the Japanese Government. 
In the cellulose project, eighteen Japanese paper and pulp 
companies, one trading company (C. ITOH) and Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) 8/ established in September 1973 a 
Japanese investment company (JPB) and the JPB contributed 49.4% 
of capital to the joint-venture company between Japan and Brazil, 
called Cenibra (Celulose Nipo-Brasileira S.A.). The factory 
started i t s operation in 1977 with a capacity of 255 000 tons per 
year of bleached eucalyptus pulp (kraft pulp). The agreement 
stipulated that Japan had an obligation to import half of i t s 
production (see Table III in the Annex). 
Cia. Siderúrgica de Tubarão (Cst) was set up in June 1976 as 
a joint-venture of three countries, Brazil, Italy and Japan. 
Japanese companies accounted for 24.5% of i t s capital, provided 
by KAWASAKI Steel Co., ISHIKAWAJIMA-HARIMA Heavy Industry and 
twelve trading companies. Moreover, the Japanese Government 
agreed in 1981 to extend a yen-loan amounting to US$100 million 
to the harbor construction adjacent to the Tubarão steel plant. 
The plant w i l l start operation in 1983 with a capacity of slab 
production, 3 million tons per year and Japan w i l l import 10% of 
the production for the f i r s t three years after the operation and 
20% thereafter. This project has BEFIEX benefits and plans to 
export 50% of i t s production (see Table IV in the Annex). 
In the case of the Amazon aluminum project, Japan set Naac 
(Nippon Amazon Aluminum Co.). The capital of Naac was shared by 
thirty two private companies (aluminum related companies and 
trading companies) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. The 
Naac and Cvrd established two joint-venture companies in 1978: 
Albras (Aluminio Brasileiro S.A.) with the Japanese share of 49% 
and Alunorte (Alumina do Norte do Brasil S.A.) with the Japanese 
share of 39.2%. Alunorte was originally planned to start 
operation in 1984 with a capacity of alumina production, 800 000 
tons per year (at full-capacity operation from 1986) and Albras 
to operate from the same year as Alunorte with a production 
capacity of aluminum, 320 000 tons per year (at full-capacity 
operation froí» 1990). The agreement stipulated that Japan import 
half production of aluminum (see Table V in the Annex). 
In connection with the Cerrado development project, Japan 
set up an investment company, JADECO, whose capital was shared by 
private companies (agricultural firms, trading companies and 
banks) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 9/. 
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JADECO and the Brazilian counterpart, Brasagro, established Cpa 
(Cia. de Promoção Agricola) in November 1978 with the Japanese 
share of 49%. When i t i s in f u l l operation, such agricultural 
crops as soybeans, wheat, corn and coffee totalling 86 000 tons 
per year w i l l be produced. Japan has no obligation to import 
those products in this case (see Table VI in the Annex). 
Japanese capital inflow to Brazil h i t another peak in 1979 
reflecting these large-scale cooperation projects, reaching 
US$409 million in spite of a decline in the number of cases (see 
again figure 1). Between 1974 and 1980 Japan's investment 
amounted to US$1 895 million, or 65% of the total investment 
accumulated in Brazil during the entire 1951-1980 period. This 
implies that Japan's investments were concentrated in the 1970's 
and reconfirms here again that Japan i s a relatively new-comer in 
the Brazilian market. 
According to the Annual of Japanese-Brazilian Enterprises in 
1980 10/, 331 companies out of the total (763) were founded 
during the 1970's while 168 companies had been founded during the 
I960's and 125 during the 1950's. This fact also supports that 
Japanese economic activities were quite new to Brazil (see Table 
4). Out of the total, commerce and trading companies accounted 
for 18.5%, the largest share among various sectors. Retail, 
wholesale and trade-related business were prosperous since they 
catered to the Japanese population in Brazil and the commercial 
trade between the two countries. 
Looking into the other side of the Japanese investment, 
education for children of Japanese families has a specific 
characteristic. Since competition of entrance examinations of 
Japanese universities i s quite tough, parents want their children 
to learn Japanese even in foreign countries. This tendency 
resulted in the fact that almost a l l Japanese children in 
invested regions enrolled in Japanese schools. In Sao Paulo 
there i s a Japanese school where teachers dispatched from Japan, 
teach the Japanese curriculum and the Japanese Government 
financially supports the school. The evolution of number of 
pupils and teachers in the Japanese school, in a sense, indicates 
rise and f a l l of the Japanese society in the invested region (see 
Table 5) . The number of students in the Sao Paulo Japanese 
School, which was established in 1967, increased up to 1981 
except 1970, reaching 905 pupils. In particular, a sharp 
increase was recorded during the 1972-1974 period which 
corresponded to the second Japanese investment boom in Brazil. 
Since 1982 the number has declined reflecting the world recession 
and the wane of investment fever. 
After the second round of the o i l c r i s i s , Brazil registered 
a minus growth in 1981 for the f i r s t time in the last 40 years. 
The debt-led economy has been agonized by the wold recession and 
high interest rates. It was necessary for Brazil to put more 
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stress on exports. Under the Figueiredo presidency, agriculture 
has been emphasized in such a large-scale project as the Carajás 
project was to start. Japan took part in these projects, too. 
The Cerrado development by Japan began to produce i t s f i r s t crop 
in 1982, and Japan agreed in 1982 to provide credit totalling 
US$500 million to the Carajás project. The Export-Import Bank of 
Japan w i l l contribute US$300 million to the project while 
commercial banks US$200 million. It i s certain that Japan's t i e 
with Brazil w i l l be further strengthened. 
3. Present situation of Japan's direct investment in Brazil 
During 1951-1982 Japan's direct investment to Brazil totalled 
US$3 545 million with 1 215 cases on the notification basis. 
With respect to the sectoral distribution of the Japanese 
investment, manufacturing investment accounted for 65% of the 
total while agriculture, forestry and fishery for 3.6%, mining 
for 5.2% and services and others for 26.2% up to the end of 1980 
(see table 6) . Japanese investment concentrated in iron and 
nonferrous metals (20.4%), followed by textiles (10%), commerce 
(8%), general machinery (7.6%) and finance and insurance (7.1%). 
Compared with the overall Japan's investment abroad, the 
shares of iron and nonferrous metals, and commerce in Brazil were 
high in both cases while the share of the chemical industries was 
low. Those of textiles and lumber and pulp in Brazil were 
relatively high. Therefore, the investment in Brazil can be said 
to be a resource-based type reflecting Brazil's rich resource 
endowments. Manufacturing investments were intended to penetrate 
into the Brazilian domestic markets. Those of commerce were 
prosperous partly because of firm trade relationships between the 
two countries and partly because of the Japanese population in 
Brazil. Banking investments were also thriving due to high 
interest rates generally prevailing in the Brazilian financial 
market. 
According to the questionnaire distributed by the Sao Paulo 
office of the Japan Overseas Enterprises Association in 1982, 
among the Japanese companies operating in Brazil with more-than-
51% capital shares, 226 companies employed 49 884 persons. 
Japanese-Brazilians accounted for 17% of the total employed. The 
number of directors dispatched from Japan was 641 persons in 298 
companies. Japanese-Brazilian directors contributed 21% to the 
total number of directors (869). 
Average net profits of 122 companies were US$700 000 per 
company. Eighty-three companies exported US$1.1 b i l l i o n , or 
about 4.7% of the total Brazilian exports in 1981. In regard to 
taxes paid, 168 companies paid US$324 million, or 1.3% of the 
current revenue of the Federal Government in 1981. Wages paid 
per company were US$1 661 000 on the average. Since the average 
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number of employee per company was 221 persons, average monthly 
wage per person was calculated to approximately US$630 (see Table 
As Japanese companies seem to contribute much to the export 
sector, we look further into this subject. The Japan Chamber of 
Commerce in Sao Paulo surveyed trade performance of Japanese 
enterprises in Brazil in 1982 11/• Sixty companies were 
interviewed and the results relating to the 1980 figures are 
summarized as follows: Exports (US$2 215.33 million, in which 
primary products, US$1 527.90 million and manufacturing products, 
US$687.43 million); and imports (US$1 382.71 million). The 
exports of the Japanese companies accounted for 11% of the total 
Brazilian exports in 1980, while imports accounted for 6% of the 
total imports. Exports of primary products accounted for 18% of 
the total primary exports of Brazil and those of manufacturing 
accounted for 6% of the total exports of industrial products. 
Out of the total exported by Japanese enterprises, 59% (US$1 317 
million) were shipped to Japan, whereas out of the total imported 
by them 62% (US$856 million) were imported from Japan. 
Direct transactions by makers accounted for only 11% of the 
total trade (exports plus imports) examined. The rest was 
handled by the Japanese trading companies in Brazil principally 
through indent transactions. The main trading companies in this 
survey included: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, C. Itoh, 
Marubeni, Nissho-Iwai, Kanematsukosho, Nichimen and Tomen. The 
Japanese trading companies contribute not only to trade between 
Japan and Brazil but also to trade between Brazil and other 
countries. These results suggest that the Japanese companies in 
B r a z i l pay an important role in the B r a z i l i a n trade, 
particularly in i t s exports. 
4. Japanese failures and successes in Brazil 
As explained, Japanese investment has concentrated into iron and 
steel and textil e sectors. Usiminas is a good example that 
Japanese steel making technology was successfully transferred. 
The Tubarão steel project w i l l contribute greatly to Brazilian 
exports. In the textile sector, only cotton yarn i s prosperous, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y contributing to the country's export sector. 
Synthetic fiber production was an example of failure which w i l l 
be explained l a t e r . In the transportation machinery, 
shipbuilding (Ishibras) has been successful and motorcycle 
production by Honda and Yamaha was another case of success. 
However, car" assembly has faced a great d i f f i c u l t y . Within 
e l e c t r i c a l machinery, heavy e l e c t r i c machinery was not 
particularly favored and the tide turned to electronic machines 
such as color T.V.'s and stereo sets. Furukawa Industrial S.A., 
a cable producer, i s regarded as one of the best profit makers 
among Japanese enterprises. The chemical industry i s at a 
disadvantage since Japan i s not competitive in this sector in the 
15 
world market. However, Fertilizantes Mitsui (fused phosphate), 
Cpc (vinyl chloride) and Cenibra (cellulose) show some signs of 
success. As failure cases synthetic fiber and automobile w i l l be 
examined and steel, cotton yarn and color T.V. sets w i l l be 
explained as success stories. 
(a) Failures 
Synthetic fiber: TEIJIN, a Japanese textile manufacturer, 
established a joint-venture company in 1972 with the Safra group 
to produce polyester. TEIJIN had a 30% share and MARUBENI had a 
10% share i n i t i a l l y . A factory was built in the Aratu industrial 
estate near Salvador with the polyester capacity of 1 000 tons 
per month taking advantage of the Nordeste incentives. As of 
September 1979, the five major synthetic fiber manufacturers 
possessed the following production capacity 12/: 
Rhodia 7 060(tons/month) 
in which: polyester 4 150 
(filament & staple) 
nylon (filament) 860 
acryl (staple) 1 OOO 
acetate (filament) 250 
rayon (staple) 800 
Fiacao Brasileira de Raion - Fibra 2 795 
in which: polyester (filament) 350 
nylon (filament) 1 075 
rayon (filament & staple) 1 370 
Celanese do Brasil 2 215 
in which: polyester 
(filament & staple) 1 670 
nylon (filament) 545 
Cia. Brasileira de Sintéticos - Cbs 1 000 
in which: polyester (filament) 860 
nylon (filament) 140 
Safron-Teijin 1 050 
in which: polyester 
(filament & staple) 1 050 
Synthetic fiber production needs high technology and the 
economy of scale i s important. Both factors made foreign capital 
participation indispensable in Brazil. Rhodia i s a 100% 
a f f i l i a t e d company of Rhone-Poulenc of France. Fibra's capital 
is shared by Snia Viscosa of Italy with 94.35% and Celanese do 
Brasil i s 100% a f f i l i a t e d company of Celanese Corporation of the 
United States of America. Hoechst A.G. of Germany shares 60% of 
Cbs. These parent companies are considered as major world 
synthetic fiber producers. Their business know-how and capital 
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endovmient are enormous and they tend to formulate oligopolistic 
markets. In Brazil consumers have traditionally a strong taste 
for cotton textiles and a r t i f i c i a l fiber has not yet been 
accepted widely. Therefore, the market i t s e l f i s small and world 
big companies made major efforts to obtain as large shares as 
possible. 
In October 1979 Celanese do Brasil bought shares of the 
Safra group (31.2% and MARUBENI (5.2%) to become the largest 
share-holder (36.4%) of the Safron-Teijin while TEIJIN, with a 
small share of 15.6% f i n a l l y withdrew from management and 
technical assistance of the company. Causes of the withdrawal 
are known to be as follows: 
(i) Undue competition took place in a limited market; 
(ii) the production scale of the Safron-Teijin factory was 
not big enough to enjoy scale merits; 
( i i i ) the local partner (the Safra group) adhered to short-
term profits while the Japanese one sought generally to 
long-term profits; 
(iv) TEIJIN and MARUBENI participated in minority share 
holding (40%) to obtain Nordeste incentives but they 
should have done majority participation. 
Automobiles: In the case of automobile production, only 
TOYOTA invested in Brazil in 1958 to produce land cruiser. Its 
capital amounted to Cr$81 875 million and the Sao Bernardo do 
Campo factory had the area of 192 363 square meter. In 1977 they 
manufactured 2 695 units of the four-wheel drive vehicle with 400 
employees (28 Japanese and 46 Japanese-Brazilians). The vehicle 
was equipped with the Diesel engines made by M. Benz do Brazil 
13/. Toyota could not have an opportunity to assemble passenger 
cars. Reasons they could not enter the passenger car market can 
be summarized as follows: 
(i) Japan started motorization during the last half of the 
I960's and Japanese car production and car exports increased 
significantly only after the 1970's. This suggests that Japanese 
cars were not well known during the 1950's and when Toyota wanted 
to produce passenger cars in Brazil, German (Volkswagen) and 
American (Ford, GM and Chrysler) car makers had already captured 
the market. 
(ii) Japanese car assembly companies use many contractors 
and subcontractors for parts production. Each car maker has i t s 
own contractor system. But in Brazil i t was d i f f i c u l t to 
organize parts manufacturers in a Japanese fashion. Japanese 
car maker was not accustomed to handling independent parts 
producers. Only a few Japanese parts makers were available in 
Brazil such as Cia. NHK-Cimebra for leaf springs and NGK do 
Brasil for sparks plugs. (In this context, this contrasts well 
to the case of such electronic machines as radios, T.V.'s and 
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stereo sets. Japanese producers could find wide range of 
Japanese parts and component makers in Brazil) . 
( i i i ) It was also d i f f i c u l t , at the beginning, to organize 
a sales network in Brazil since the Japanese belong to the ethnic 
minority group. 
(iv) After the f i r s t o i l c r i s i s , there was a chance for 
Japanese car manufacturers to enter the Brazilian market with 
economy cars. In fact, TOYOTA sent a mission to the State of 
Minas Gerais to survey a construction plan of a factory and 
NISSAN to Rio de Janeiro, but those plans were not finalized. 
Instead, Fiat of Italy constructed a factory in Bello Horizonte 
in 1976 to produce small passenger cars and they succeeded in 
obtaining a 9-10% share in the market. The management of both 
TOYOTA and NISSAN lacked quick and daring decision at that time 
or maybe they were risk-abators. 
It i s now quite d i f f i c u l t for Japanese makers to enter the 
Brazilian market with production of passenger cars. Next chance 
w i l l be when the Brazilian Government introduces str i c t e r anti-
pollution laws, especially, the installation of smog control 
device since Japanese cars have a high reputation for such 
device. 
According to the Jitsugyo no Burajiru (April, 1982), 108 
Japanese enterprises withdrew or stopped operation out of the 
total of 410 during the 1975-1981 period. In the case of joint-
ventures between Japanese and Brazilian companies, 33 out of 101 
withdrew or ceased operation while in the case of those between 
Japanese and Japanese-Brazilian companies, 17 out of 54 withdrew. 
Out of the total of 190 enterprises with a 100% Japanese capital 
owned by one parent company, 45 withdrew or stopped their 
operation during the same period (see Table 8) . This suggests 
that Japanese wholly-owned companies and joint-ventures among 
Japanese companies have a higher probability to achieve success 
than those entities created between the Japanese and Brazilian. 
In the failure cases of joint-ventures between Japanese and 
Brazilian companies, synthetic fiber production (polyester and 
acrylonitrile) and textile-related a c t i v i t i e s such a dyeing, 
knitting and apparel making were most affected sectors. Out of 
the 33 enterprises, twelve f e l l into this category. Ataka 
related a c t i v i t i e s (seven joint-ventures in Brazil= ceased 
operation since the parent company, ATAKA, the ninth biggest 
trading company in Japan at that time, went bankrupt in 1977. 
Out of the 45 failure cases in the wholly-owned companies by 
Japan, construction and real state enterprises especially 
recorded large losses. Eleven withdrew from Brazil during the 
1975-1981 period. The main reason of this failure was 
attributable to insufficient market research before entering the 
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Brazilian market. Brazil has a good reputation in road and 
building construction and, thus, Brazilian construction companies 
are quite competitive, Brazil does not need earthquake-proof 
buildings which use shape steels like in Japan. The Japanese 
construction technique costs more than that of Brazil. Moreover, 
Federal and state governments give preference to local 
construction companies with respect to tenders of public 
investments. 
Finally, common causes of failure are summarized as follows: 
(i) There exists a different entrepreneurial philosophy 
between Japanese and Brazilian partners. Brazilian owners tend 
to seek short-run profits and i f a company does not make a 
p r o f i t , they want to liquidate the company. Japanese 
representatives think that a company is something like a boat 
where both employer and employee get on board and cooperate 
together to s a i l . They want to share the same destiny. This 
thought stems from the fact that presidents of Japanese companies 
are generally hired management executives, while Brazilian 
counterparts are owners of companies and have sometimes strong 
personal interests in the operation of the company. Separation 
between management and ownership is not sufficiently done in 
Brazil. 
(i i ) Japanese enterprises have usually a characteristic of 
a low equity-debt ratio. They depend heavily on loan capital. 
However, interest rates are extremely high in Brazil so that high 
financial costs sometimes lead to a shutdown of enterprises. 
( i i i ) Japanese businessmen are not accustomed to management 
under high inflation prevailing in such countries as Brazil. It 
brings about several revisions of investment and re-calculations 
of production cost. Cost-current attitude of the Japanese 
managers w i l l always be betrayed by high price increases in 
materials and inflation-indexed wage adjustments. 
(iv) Since the Brazilian currency follows successive 
devaluations, Japanese parent companies sometimes can not accept 
the decrease in assets denominated in terms of yen. 
(V) The Brazilian Government imposes tough regulations on 
business ac t i v i t i e s such as local contents, import controls, 
prior import deposits and visa controls. In addition, those 
regulations change quite often. It hinders stable long-term 
production plans. 
(vi) There exists an information gap between Japan and 
Brazil because of the long distance between the two countries. 
Undue market research sometimes causes fate of Japanese companies 
in Brazil. Precise information on "country risk", regulations on 
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foreign investments, tax systems, labor habits, etc. i s v i t a l to 
successful business in Brazil. 
(b) Successes 
Steel: Usiminas i s a success story not only from the 
technological point of view but also from the economic assistance 
point of view. The Usiminas factory i s an integrated ironworks 
with a capacity of 3.5 million tons per year of crude steel and 
i t s quality i s recognized as the highest in Latin America. The 
Japanese Government backed up the project financially and the 
project became a monumental case in the history of the Japanese 
investment abroad in terms of the cooperation between the 
Government and private enterprises. 
After receiving a request from the Brazilian Government to 
assist a steel m i l l construction in the State of Minas Gerais in 
April 1956, the Japanese Cabinet approved the project in April 
1957. The intention of the Government was to promote Japanese 
plant export and to deepen further economic ties between the two 
countries. Japan set up Japan Usiminas Co. in December 1957 
which acted as a partner with the Brazilian counterpart. Usinas 
Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais S.A. The i n i t i a l capacity of crude 
steel of the planned mill was set at 500 000 tons per year and 
five directors were divided into three Brazilians (including 
president) and two Japanese. Capital amounting to Cr$3.2 b i l l i o n 
was shared by Japan (40%) and Brazil (60%). On the Brazilian 
side, capital was shared by the State of Minas Gerais (20%), BNDE 
(18%) and others (22%) while the Japanese share was divided among 
the private consortium (33%) and the Government financial 
institution, OECF (7%). The total cost of investment was 
estimated around US$270 million. The f i r s t blast furnace came 
into operation in 1962 and the integrated f a c i l i t i e s were 
completed in 1965. Ipatinga, once a village of five hundred 
inhabitants, was transformed into an iron town of 50 000 
inhabitants. 
NIPPON STEEL CO. played a fundamental role in terms of funds 
and technology for the m i l l . However, several times Usiminas ran 
short of fund due to chronical i n f l a t i o n , especially, 
hyperinflation during the 1963-1964 period and due to high 
infrastructure costs of the town. In addition, the capacity of 
Usiminas was expanded three times because of the increasing 
demand based on the rapid growth of the Brazilian economy. For 
each occasion, Japan responded to assist the project financially 
and technically, (see Table 9). 
Up to the present, capital payments totalled 34.2 b i l l i o n 
yen (approximately US$112 million) in which OECF shared 11.6 
b i l l i o n yen, or 34% of the total paid-up capital by Japan. The 
Export-Import Bank of Japan provided export credits totalling 
122.3 b i l l i o n yen (approximately US$455 million). Thus, the 
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total financial support by Japan amounted to around US$567 
million, or 21% of the total investment costs. Moreover, the 
Japanese Government decided to offer yen loans to Usiminas twice. 
F i r s t l y , in 1962, the Export-Import Bank of Japan gave loans 
amounting to 6 317 million yen to BNDE in order to cover the 
Brazilian share of the capital increase of Usiminas. Secondly, 
in 1965 when Brazil faced a rescheduling of i t s external debts, 
Japan refinanced time-expired repayments of the Usiminas debt, 
amounting to 13 746 million yen. 
The success of Usiminas can be summarized as follows: 
(i) The Japanese Government and private companies assisted 
the project hand in hand and the Government financial support, in 
particular, was v i t a l to the project. 
( i i ) NIPPON STEEL CO. introduced the most modern 
technology available in Japan to Brazil and Brazilian workers 
were trained both in Japan and Brazil. NIPPON STEEL assisted the 
m i l l from the stage of i t s plan to maintenance of the plant after 
the turn-key operation. For three years after the i n i t i a l 
operations, about 100 Japanese technicians had posted at key 
positions of the production line, in addition, between 1957 and 
1975 the same Brazilian president managed the company so that 
consistent manpower capacitation programs were able to be 
performed. 
( i i i ) The Brazilian economy had expanded rapidly so that 
domestic demand for steel was quite sound during the period. 
Japan Usiminas Co. had only a 11.2% share of the capital in 
January 198 3 14/, but Japanese technology and equipment, 
demonstrated in the Usiminas project, helped Japanese economic 
ac t i v i t i e s substantially in Brazil thereafter. To sum up, the 
t r i n i t y of economic cooperation, i.e. combination funds, manpower 
development and technology worked well in this case. 
Cotton yarn: Spinning mills are concentrated in the State 
of Sao Paulo. The total production capacity of the state was 
estimated to 1 776 000 spindles, in which Japanese yarn mills 
accounted for 20% (361 000 spindles) in 1978. Japanese spinning 
companies entered the Brazilian market with two waves: f i r s t , 
during the 1955-1960 period (TOYOBO, KANEBO, UNITIKA and TSUZUKI) 
and second, during the 1972-1973 period (NISSHINBO, KURASHIKIBO, 
DAIWABO and OMIKENSHI) (see Table 10) . they a l l brought new 
spinning machines into Brazil so that the quality of their 
products was high. Soon they caught up with Brazilian makers and 
their products were favored by foreign buyers. Exports of cotton 
yarn increased, particularly so after Kanebo obtained BEFIEX 
incentives. It was in June 1965 that Kanebo received the honor 
of the f i r s t Brazilian cotton yarn exporter to the United States 
of America. In 1978, cotton yarn exports from the Santos Port 
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amounted to 39 387 tons in which eight Japanese spinning firms 
accounted for 45% (see Table 11). 
Japanese success in this f i e l d i s attributable to the 
following factors: 
(i) They brought modern spinning machines so that they 
could compete with Brazilian firms whose machines were generally 
obsolete. 
(ii ) At the same time, maintenance of the machines and 
cleaning of the inside of the mill were thoroughly done in the 
Japanese factories. This helped to increase efficiency of 
production (Kanebo pointed out that because of a lack of 
maintenance works and bad production process controls, 
productivity of a spinning machine was one f i f t h of that of Japan 
when the company took over Fiacao Extra Fina de Algodão S.A. in 
1963). 
( i i i ) The Brazilian market was large, particularly, for 
cotton textiles. The Sao Paulo state produced 210 000 tons of 
yarn in 1978, in which cotton yarn accounted for 85% and mixed 
yarn of cotton and polyester occupied only 8%. 
(iv) In Japan cotton spinning has long been considered as a 
non-competitive sector since the 1950's partly due to oversupply 
and competition from synthetic fiber and partly due to the catch-
up of Asian countries. They needed a frontier to survive in 
foreign countries by the use of accumulated know-how. Therefore, 
i f raw cotton were cheaply supplied, combined with low labor 
costs, Japanese firms could compete well. 
Their problem now i s diversification i.e., development of 
upstream and downstream act i v i t i e s . Toyobo has a knitting 
factory and Kanebo has a gingery in Brazil but weaving and 
apparel industries are l e f t untouched by the Japanese companies. 
Color T.V. sets: Japan has a strong competitive position in 
consumer electronic goods such as radio receivers, T.V.'s, tape 
recorders, component stereo sets and video tape recorders. 
However, Japan entered the Brazilian market which had already 
received large investments from European and North American 
producers. The Manaus Free Trade Zone, assigned in 1967, became 
a springboard for Japanese makers to produce these goods in 
Brazil. Japanese electronic makers established joint-ventures 
with Brazilian partners and constructed factories in the zone in 
order to exploit incentives given by the zone authority 
(SUFRAMA). 
SANYO set up a color T.V. factory with Pereira Lopes-Ibesa, 
TOSHIBA with Semp, SHARP with Sharp S.A., MITSUBISHI with Evadin 
and MATSUSHITA with Springer. The Japanese late-comers had high 
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quality goods but lacked business know-how in Brazil. Local 
partners, who had been suffering from European and North American 
producers' competition, taught the Japanese ones managerial 
s k i l l s . This happy marriage brought about a bonanza in consumer 
electronics, in particular, color T.V.'s and music center sets 
against the already-existed producers. 
Commercial color T.V. programs were f i r s t transmitted in 
Brazil in 1972. Since then, the production of color T.V. sets 
has rapidly increased. The number of color T.V. production rose 
from 68 000 in 1972 to 1 074 000 sets in 1979. It reached 111 
500 sets per month in May, 1980. Out of the total production, 
Japanese joint-ventures accounted for 50% in that month (see 
Table 12) . In the case of the music center, Japanese joint-
ventures accounted for 58% of the total monthly production 15/. 
Reasons of the success in this f i e l d include: 
(i) High quality of the Japanese products was the key to 
this advance. 
(ii) The Manaus Free Trade Zone played an important role. 
The Japanese joint-ventures could import high quality parts and 
machines from Japan with tax exemption, although the consumer 
market was quite far from the producing area and SUFRAMA levied 
severe local content requirements. 
( i i i ) Japanese parts and component makers entered Brazil in 
concert with Japanese set makers. Such makers as Toko, R-ohm, 
National Components and Alps supplied reliable parts to Japanese 
set makers and, as a result, the quality of f i n a l products were 
maintained. 
(iv) There has been a strong demand for consumer durables 
since per capita income has been increasing during the 1970's. 
In addition, the Soccer World Cup held in Buenos Aires in 1978, 
created a big leap in demand for color T.V. sets, 
(V) Consumer finance i s relatively well developed in 
Brazil. 
5. Business interaction between Japan 
and the United States in Brazil 
As has already been explained, Japan's investment concentrated in 
such manufactviring sectors as iron and steel, textiles, general 
machinery, pulp and electronic machinery. But automobiles, 
chemicals, banking and consulting industries are weak sectors for 
the Japanese in Brazil. The United States investment i s , pn the 
other hand, vigorous in these fields so that the division of 
labor works well between the two countries reflecting their 
competitiveness. 
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In the future, the competition seems to be intense in the 
e l e c t r o n i c s s e c t o r : semiconductor, computer and 
telecommunications. Japan has a comparative advantage in 
electronics, especially color T.V.'s, stereo sets and video tape 
recorders in Brazil in spite of local content requirements. 
Semiconductor products are gradually increasing since they are 
frequently used in telecommunication equipment and computer 
components as well as in usual electronic machines. Electronics 
war, which i s fought between Japan and the United States over the 
Silicon valley, may occur in Brazil but this time among four 
countries: West Germany, the United States, Japan and Brazil 
i t s e l f . Major electronic component producers are: Icotron 
(Siemens), Stevenson (AFG-Telefunken), Texas (Texas Instruments), 
Inducen (GE) and Sharp Componentes (Sharp group). Japanese 
component makers are now small but they can be easily expands 
when demand expands. 
In this f i e l d , the Brazilian Government also wants to 
es t a b l i s h national interests because of security reasons. 
Transit Semicondutores S.A. i s supported by the Government and 
CceOs sales are rising. Such sectors as telecommunications, 
computer and electronic instrumentation require the majority 
equity holding by local capital. But since this f i e l d depends on 
high technology, foreign influence i s inevitable and competition 
among foreign companies w i l l become severe. For example, in the 
case of mini-computers, the guidance of the Government through 
CAPRE (Comissão de Coordenação das Atividades de Processamento 
Eletrônico) was to have Brazilians own the company's capital and 
to control i t s management by them. Foreign companies assisted 
Brazilian ones to transfer their technology. At f i r s t , four 
mini-computer companies were approved in 1977. Those were: 
(i) Cobra (Computadores e Sistemas S.A.), owned by the 
Government with the Sycor (U.S.A.) technology; 
(ii ) Sid, consortium of Sharp, Inepar and Dataserve with the 
Logabax (France) Technology; 
( i i i ) Edisa (Eletrônica Digital S.A.), twelve companies with 
FUJITSU (Japan) technology; 
(iv) Labo Eletrônica S.A., Forsa group with the Nixdorf 
(West Germany) technology. 
In 1978, Siseo (Sistemas e Computadores S.A.) was also 
approved. In regard to medium-size computers. Cobra and Siseo 
declared the production. In the computer f i e l d , attention i s 
especially being paid to the approach of IBM to the Brazilian 
market. 
The United States move to establish a bilateral agreement in 
s c i e n t i f i c and technical cooperation, a result of President 
Ronald Reagan's v i s i t to Brazil in December 1982, w i l l greatly 
encourage the United States investment in these C & C (computer 
and communieatien) fields. 
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The United States and European groups have considerable 
exposure in energy development in Brazil such as nuclear plant, 
heavy electric machinery and o i l exploration and extraction 
equipment. The United States has recently decided to assist 
hydroelectric, thermo-power and coal gasification projects while 
Japan has so far no plan in this f i e l d . 
Since Japan prohibits investing in the weapon industry, the 
United States and European countries w i l l take advantage in this 
sector. Brazil i s now ranked as the seventh biggest exporter of 
weaponry in the world and i t s demand is expanding due to mounting 
international insecurities. 
In summary, Japan's investment i s not represented so far in 
Brazil. Therefore, there is no major conflict between Japan and 
the United States in the investment domain. Orderly investments 
have been made reflecting competitiveness of their commodities 
and the division of labor between the two countries was 
maintained. 
With respect to future collaboration between Japan and the 
United States of America, several suggestions can be made. 
B r a z i l i s now suffering from world recession and an 
extraordinarily heavy debt burden. The Brazilian economy cannot 
escape a slow or even negative growth in the coming years. 
Externally, export sectors w i l l have trouble in finding buyers 
since industrial countries have not yet recovered from the 
prolonged recession. 
In the short-run, Brazil has to settle the debt payment. 
Regarding this matter, Japan and the United States of America are 
able to help Brazil. Commercial banks of the two countries w i l l 
prepare new loans to Brazil through co-financing. Actually, 
Brazil asked several industrialized countries in September 1983 
to cover the repayment through new credits, totalling US$10 
b i l l i o n , which w i l l be due up to the end of 1984. Commercial 
banks were asked to share 60% of the said amount. 
In the long-run, Brazil's export sectors w i l l affect the 
global industrial structure. For example, the main industrial 
countries now have integrated iron and steel works in their own 
countries. However, i f the middle-income countries like Brazil 
can export semi-finished steel products, some industrial 
countries do not necessarily have upstream acti v i t i e s in the iron 
and steel industry. This sort of boomerang effects of investment 
w i l l lead to restructuring of industries in advanced countries. 
In particular, the United States of America tends to put emphasis 
on the downstream of the steel industry. Therefore, i t i s 
advisable that the United States import slabs and other semi-
finished steel products from Brazil. 
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In the case of aluminum, the pattern in which industrial 
countries produce aluminum using imported alumina w i l l be also 
affected as a result of the aluminum production by middle-income 
countries. It i s said that the Japanese aluminum project in 
Brazil i s delayed because of the world-wide recession. The 
production capacity of 80 000 tons per year and i t w i l l probably 
reach a 320 000 ton level in 1989. They w i l l mainly use imported 
alumina at f i r s t because of the excess-supply condition of the 
world alumina market. On the other hand, the Alunorte project in 
alumina w i l l not start i t s operation until 1989. There i s a 
possible Japan-United States cooperation in this occasion. The 
form of cooperation can be that the Alcoa project in Sao Luis, 
which w i l l start production in 1984, can supply alumina to the 
Japanese Albras project for the aluminum production. 
The Brazilian agriculture w i l l also influence the world flow 
of agricultural products when the Cerrado area i s completely 
exploited. The Government of Japan committed to extend yen-
denominated loans to the development of irrigation systems in the 
Cerrado product, amounting 12 021 million yen in March, 1983. 
Japan not being accustomed to large-scale farming, the United 
States experience in farming, particularly, machine-intensive 
agriculture with a large-scale sprinkler system w i l l greatly help 
the Cerrado development project. 
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Notas 
1/ The views and interpretations in this report are those 
of the author and should not be attributed to the Economic 
Commission for Latin America. I would like to thank Professor M. 
Shinohara, Mr. N. Tabe and Mr. M. Kosaka of the Institute of 
Developing Economies in Tokyo for their encouragement and my 
thanks also to Dr. Leon Hollerman and Dr. M. Kuwayama for their 
valuable comments. I would like to express my thanks to Dr. paul 
Kreisberg of the Council on Foreign Relations for giving me this 
opportunity. Needless to say that possible error in the text 
w i l l be f u l l y my responsibility. 
2J The Export-Import Bank of Japan was established in 1950 
as a Government financial institution to complement and encourage 
commercial banks in financing exports, imports and overseas 
investment. The Export-Import Bank of Japan started i t s overseas 
investment lending operation in 1953. See Table I and Table II 
in Annex. 
3 / Total reserves (minus gold) rose from US$1 715 million 
in 1964 to US$17 564 million in 1972, though they decreased to 
US$11 355 million in 1973 due to the f i r s t round of the o i l 
c r i s i s (MMF, International Financial Statistics-Yearbook 1982, 
July 1982) . 
i / After World War II in 1952 the emigration to Brazil 
restarted and between 1952 and 1977, 52 086 Japanese crossed the 
Pacific Ocean. 
5/ It i s said that Japanese-Brazilians account for 70-80% 
of the perishable sales marketed to the Central Market of Sao 
Paulo (CEAGESP). 
6/ "Grupos - Os 300 maiores", Balanço anual 1981 (Gazeta 
mercantil, sete., 1981). 
7/ The tax sparing credit system is applied in Japan. In 
the case of interest payments, on the supposition that the fixed 
rate of 20% i s paid in Brazil, the rate of 12,5% i s actually 
applied in Japan so that the difference of 7.5% i s rebated as a 
tax credit. Tax sparing rates for other items are fixed at 25%. 
8/ OECF was founded in 1960 to contribute to the economic 
development and s t a b i l i z a t i o n of developing countries by 
f a c i l i t a t i n g the supply of funds. The Export-Import Bank of 
Japan had also been engaged with o f f i c i a l development assistance 
(ODA) u n t i l July 1975 when a l l ODA activities were delegated to 
the OECF. 
9/ JICA is a Government organization, established in 1974 
and i s engaged in Japan's international technical cooperation for 
developing countries, JICA inherited the a c t i v i t i e s of Overseas 
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Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA, established in 1963). 
10/ Burajiru nikkei kygyo nenkan 1980 (Annual of Japanese-
Brazilian Enterprises in 1980), Jitsugyo no Burajiru-sha, Sao 
Paulo, 1980. 
il / Burajiru Keizai Joho (Boletim Informativo da Cámara de 
Commercio e Industria Japonesa do Brasil), N''586, May 15, 1982. 
12/ M. Kagami, "Burajiru no Seni Sangyo", Hattentojokoku no 
Seni Sangyo ("The Textile Industry in Brazil" in Textile 
Industries in Developing Countries), Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1980. 
13/ M. Kagami, "Burajiru no Jidosha Sangyo", Hattentojokoku 
no Jidosha Sangyo ("The Automotive Industry in Brazil" in 
Automotive Industries in Developing Countries), Institute of 
Developing Economies, 1980. 
14/ The Japanese capital shared by OECF (38.4%), NIPPON 
STEEL (14.4%), ISHIKAWAJIMA-HARIMA (7.7%), NIPPON KOKAN (4.5%) 
and MITSUBISHI Heavy Industries (4.4%). CM. Kosaka et. a l . , 
Keizai Kyoryoku Koka Kenkyu Hokokusho-Burajiru (Evaluations of 
Economic Assistance Projects in Brazil), Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1983. 
15/ M. Kagami, "Burajiru no Denki-denshi Sangyo", 
Hattento j okoku no Denki-denshi Sangyo ("The Electric and 
Electronic Industries in Brazil" in Electric and Electronic 
Industries in Developing Countries), Institute of Developing 
Economies, 1981. 
Figure 1 
JAPAN'S DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT TO BRAZIL 
(Annual amount from 1970 to 1982) 
Year Number of cases (cases) 
1970 **** 22 
1971 ***** 25 
1972 ******************** 93 
1973 **************************************** 2.97 
1974 ****************************** 144 
1975 *************** 77 
1976 *************** 77 
1977 ***************** 84 
1978 ***************** 86 
1979 *********** 55 
1980 ******** 38 I 
1981 *********** 53 s 
1982 ****** 31 ° 
Value (US$ million) 
1970 ***** 20 
1971 ********************** 122 
1972 ******************************* 169 
1973 ********************************************************************************* 435 
1974 *********************************************** 250 
1975 ****************************************************** 271 
1976 ****************************************************** 270 
1977 ***************************************************** 267 
1978 ************************************************** 258 
1979 ****************************************************************************** 409 
1980 ******************************* 170 
1981 *************************************************************** 316 
1982 **************************************************************** 322 
+ + + + + + +__+__+ + + + + + + 4 - + + + + 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400 420 
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TABLE 1 
JAPAN'S DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT 












1951-1970 3 733 3 577 .958 
1971-1982 25 330 49 554 1 956 
Total 
(1951-1982) 
29 063 53 131 1 828 
Sources; Ministry of Finance, Zaiseikinuy Tokei Geppo (Monthly 
Statistics of Money and Finance), N''356, December 1981, and 
Foreign Press Center, "Direct Overseas Investment Registered 
During Fiscal 1982", June 1983. 
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TABLE 2 
JAPAN'S DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY 
miti US$ million) 
Country FY 1951-1982 Share (%) 
1. United States 13 970 26.3 
2. Indonesia 7 268 13.7 
3. Brazil 3 545 6.7 
4. Australia 2 882 5.4 
5. United Kingdom 2 296 4.3 
6. Panama 2 022 3.8 
7. Hong Kong 1 825 3.4 
8. Liberia 1 692 3.2 
9. Singapore 1 383 2.6 
10. Korea 1 312 2.5 
Subtotal 38 195 71.9 
World Total 53 131 100.0 
Source; The same as Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 
JAPAN'S DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY 
(Accumulated value, on the notification basis) 
(Unit; USS million) 
Industries FY 1951-•1982 Share (%) 
Manufacturing 16 952 31.9 
Food 806 1.5 
Textiles 1 795 3.4 
Lumber and pulp 899 1.7 
Chemicals 3 176 6.0 
Iron and nonferrous 3 608 6.8 
metals 
General machinery 1 265 2.4 
Electric and electronic 2 322 4.4 
machinery 
Transportation machinery 1 822 3.4 
Others 1 258 2.4 
Agriculture, Forestry and 1 081 2.0 
fishery 
Mining 10 291 19.4 
Services 22 644 42.6 
Construction 536 1.0 
Commerce 8 482 16.0 
Finance and insurance 3 802 7.1 
Other services 9 824 18.5 
Others a/ 2 163 4.1 
Total 53 131 100.0 
Source; The same as Table 1. 
a/ Including investment in real estate and establishment of 
offices and branches. 
34 
TABLE 4 
FCUMDAnON YEAFS OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES IN BRAZIL V 
(Uhit; NUiriber of oonipanies) 
Industries Before 
1949 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 No data Total 
Agriculture, Forestry 7 9 20 25 9 70 
and Fishery fe/ 
Iron emd nonferrous 3 4 8 22 2 39 
General machinery 6 12 13 27 7 65 
Transportation 0 5 2 8 2 17 
machinery 
Electric and electronic 0 6 15 33 4 58 
machinery 
Precision machinery 1 1 1 6 0 9 
Chemicals 4 9 16 27 7 63 
Textiles 6 8 7 18 4 43 
Food and Beverages 3 6 12 12 5 38 
Other manufacturing 3 5 9 12 3 32 
Construction and real 2 10 16 33 6 67 
Commerce and trading 16 36 31 41 17 141 
Finance and insurance 4 3 10 26 5 48 
Other services 4 11 8 41 9 73 
Total 59 125 168 331 80 763 
Source; Jitsugyo no Burajiru-sha, Burajiru nikkei kigyo nengan 1980 (Annual of 
Japanese-Brazilian Enterprises in 1980), Sao Paulo, 1981. 
a/ Not only carpanies v*iose capital is owned by Japanese entities but also those 
by Japanese-Brazilians are included, 
fe/ Including cooperative society. 
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TABLE 5 
EVOLUTION OF NUMBER OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS 
IN THE SAO PAULO JAPANESE SCHOOL 
(From the f i r s t to the ninth grades) 
(Unit; persons) 
Year Pupils Teachers 
1967 28 3 
1968 48 6 
1969 74 12 
1970 72 12 
1971 83 14 
1972 145 16 
1973 293 19 
1974 435 27 
1975 582 30 
1976 657 35 
1977 695 35 
1978 830 36 
1979 872 41 
1980 900 43 
1981 905 44 
1982 852 44 
1983 732 33 
Source; The Sao Paulo Japanese School. 
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TABLE 6 
JAPAN'S DIRECT OVERSEAS INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL BY INDUSTRY 
(Accumulated value as of December 31. 1980) 
Number of Cases Amount 
Industries Number Share (%) US$ million Share(%) 
Manufacturing 440 38.9 1 891 65.0 
Food 48 4.2 103 3.5 
Textiles 84 7.4 291 10.0 
Lumber and pulp 22 1.9 182 6.3 
Chemicals 37 3.3 82 2.8 
Iron and nonferrous 48 4.2 593 20.4 
General machinery 82 7.3 221 7.6 
Electric and 58 5.1 168 5.8 
electronic machinery 
Transportation 10 0.9 184 6.3 
machinery 
Others 51 4.5 68 2.3 
Agriculture, forestry 75 6.6 106 3.6 
and fishery 
Mining 45 4.0 151 5.2 
Services 522 46.2 746 25.6 
Construction 36 3.2 54 1.9 
Commerce 179 15.8 234 8.0 
Finance and 37 3.3 207 7.1 
insurance 
Other services 270 23.9 251 8.6 
Others a/ 49 4.3 15 0.5 
Total 1 131 100.0 2 908 100.0 
Source : Ministry of Finance, Zaiseikinyu Tokei Geppo (Monthly 
Statistics of Money and Finance), N''356, December 1981, 
a/ Including investment in real estate and establishment of 
representative offices and branches. 
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TABLE 7 
RESULTS OF THE JAPANESE ENTERPRISE SURVEY 
IN BRAZIL - 1981 a/ 
Amount (US$ million) Number of Average per 
Items or persons firms firms 
replied replied 
Annual sales 4 841.7 175 27.7 
Annual export earnings 1 096.7 83 13.2 
Net profits 81.2 122 0.7 
Wages paid 294.0 177 1.7 
Taxes paid b/ 323.8 168 1.9 
Total employees 49 000 226 221 
in which: 
Japanese-Brazilians 8 712 - 39 
Number of managerial 4 439 190 23 
(supervisory) members 
in which: 
From Japan 881 - 5 
Japanese-Brazilians 1 324 - 7 
Number of directors 869 298 3 
in which: 
From Japan 641 - 2 
Japanese-Brazilians 186 0. 
Source: Japan Overseas Enterprises Association, Sao Paulo 
office. 
a/ Those enterprises whose capital i s owned by Japanese parent 
companies more than 51%. 
b/ Including principally IPI, ICM, corporate tax and payments on 
social securities such as INPS and FGTS. 
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TABLE 8 
FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN BRAZIL 
DURING THE 1975-1981 PERIOD 
(Unit; comtaanies) 





Japanese & Brazilian 33 32.7 68 67.3 101 
Japanese & Japanese-
Brazilian 17 31.5 37 68.5 54 
Japanese & Japanese 13 20.0 52 80.0 65 
(2) Japanese-wholly 
owned companies 45 23.7 145 76.3 190 
Total 108 27.0 302 73.0 410 




ESTIMATES OF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
TO THE USIMINAS PROJECT 
Total 
investment Japan's assistance 
costs (Billion Yen) 
(US$ million) Capital â/ Export Total 
credits b/ 
I n i t i a l stage (capacity 270 14.7 (2.7) 36.2 50.9 
of crude steel, 500 000 
t/year completed in 1965) 
The f i r s t expansion 288 7.3 (2.5) 19.5 26.8 
phase (1.4 million 
t/year completed 
in 1974) 
The second expansion 580 9.4 (5.0) 17.0 26.4 
phase (2.4 million 
t/year,completed 
in 1976) 
The third expansion 1 530 2.8 (1.4) 49.6 52.4 
phase (3.5 million 
t/year, completed 
in 1982) 
Total 2 668 34.2 (11.6) 122.3 156.5 
Source; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Kaizai 
Kyoruoku no Genjo to Mondaiten - 1982 (Economic Assistance-
Present Situation and i t s Problems - 1982), 1983. 
a/ Paid-up capital by Japan, figures in parentheses show the 
quota by OECF. 
b/ Supplier's credits except for the second expansion phase 
which was financed through buyer's credits by the Export-Import 
Bank of Japan. 
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TABIE 10 





Share a/ Production 
Capacity 





























































Source; M. Kagami, "Burajiru no Seni Sangyo", Hattento j okoku no Seni Sangyo 
("Ihe Textile Industry in Brazil" in Textile Industries in Developing Oountries), 
Institute of Developing Economies, 1980. 
a/ Capital shares in 1981 according to Burajiru Kigyo nenkan 1982 (Annual of 
Japanese-Brazilian Enterprises in 1982). 
fe/ (c) ; cotton yam and (t/c) ; mixed yam of cotton and polyester. 
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TABLE 11 
BRAZILIAN COTTON YARN EXPORTS 
(Shipped from the Santos Port. 1978) 
(Unit? tons) 
Firms Japan EEC U.S.A. Other Total 
Countries Share(%) 
Eight 2 986 6 945 420 7 345 17 698 44.9 
Japanese 
firms a/ 
Filobel - 1 349 — 981 2 330 5.9 
Vanini - 724 > 1 073 1 797 4.7 
Sta. Elizabeth - 1 193 - 598 1 791 4.5 
Ag. Boyes - 1 157 - 611 1 768 4.5 
Matarazzo 1 842 - 887 1 730 4.4 
Nova Odessa - 745 - 808 1 553 3.9 
S. Bernardo - 1 239 - 161 1 400 3.6 
Amparo - 251 - 416 667 1.7 
C. B. Fiacao - 405 - 236 641 1.6 
Marcelino - 120 - 376 496 1.3 
Javense - 295 - 125 420 1.1 
Sao Joao - 264 - 121 385 1.0 
Leop. Schmalz - 155 - 45 200 0.5 
I. Chamma - 153 - 31 184 0.5 
S t i l l - 125 - 55 180 0.4 
Cot. Paulista - 134 - - 134 0.3 
Others 461 28 5 527 6 015 15.3 
Total 2 987 16 556 448 19 396 39 387 100.0 
Source; The same as Table 10. 
a/ Eight Japanese firms are; Kanebo, Toyobo, Nisshinbo, Omi-
Z i l l o , Daiwa, Tsuzuki, Unitika and Kurashiki. 
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TABUS 12 
MDNIHLY EROEüCnC»! OF CONSUMER ELECTRONIC GOODS (MAY 1980) 
(Uhit: sets) 
21. Pan eletrônica 
22. Delta 







































I.Sanyo 9 000 34 000 1 000 1 500 
2.SenDp-Ttoeihiha 18 000 12 000 31 000 3 000 
3.National 7 000 15 000 4 000 
4.Sony 2 000 3 500 
5.Sharp 23 000 20 000 3 000 6 000 
6.Mitsubishi 5 000 20 000 2 000 1 000 
7.Nissei 15 000 17 000 300 
8.Motoradio 45 000 30 000 
9.Telefuhk]en 20 000 15 000 15 000 2 000 
lO.Kiilco 40 000 22 000 18 000 5 000 
ll.Riilips 25 000 18 000 38 000 10 000 5 000 
12.Colorado 15 000 500 
13.Cae 5 000 37 000 8 000 4 000 
14.Polivo)c 5 000 
15. Gradiente 12 500 
16.Bosch 55 000 
17.Cash box 20 000 
18.Sonata 3 000 14 000 
19.Taterka 2 500 







Total 120 000 111 500 31 350 320 500 174 300 33 300 
Source: M. Kagami, "Burajiru no Denki-denshi Sangyo", Hattento j okoku no Denki-
denshi Sangyo ("Ihe Electric and Electronic Industries in Brazil" in Electric and 
Electronic Industries in Developing Oountries), Institute of Developing 
Economies, Tokyo, 1981. 
43 
TABLE I 
GRANTS AND GOVERNMENT YEN-LOANS TO BRAZIL 
Date Items Amount (million yen) 
(Grants) 
Feb. 1979 Audio-visual aids 36 
(Yen-Loans, Commitment base) 
Nov. 1962 Funds for the capital increase 6 317 fe/ of Usiminas 
Dec. 1981 Construction of the Port of 11 985 S/ 
Tubarão, construction of 2 975 fi/ the Port of Vil a do Conde 
Purchase of a dredger 7 040 fi/ 
(Refinance) 
Feb. 1965 Refinance I 2 776 â/ July 1965 Refinance II a/ 8 952 fi/ Oct. 1965 Refinance III â/ 4 794 «/ 
Source; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Keizai 
Kyoryoku no Genjo to Mondaiten - 1982 (Economic Assistance-
Present Situation and i t s Problems - 1982), 1983. 
a/ Refinance for time-expired debt of Usiminas. 
fe/ The loan condition was a 6% annual interest rate (i) for 10 
years (t) with a 5-year grace period (g.p.) 
Ç/ The loan condition: i« 5.75%, t=17 years and g.p.* 5 years 
d/ The loan condition: i= 5.75%, t= 7 years and g.p.» 2 years 
e/ The loan condition: i» 5.50%, t= 8 years and g.p.» 3 years 
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TABLE II 
BUYER'S CREDIT AND BANK LOANS BY THE 
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF JAPAN 
(Commitment base, as of December 31. 1981) i / 
(Unit; Million Yen) 
Item Contracted Amount Joint-finance 
Hydroelectric development 
Furnas I (Malibondo) 
Furnas II (Itumbiara) 
Cemig (Sao Simon) 
















Banco do Brasil 
Apr.20, 1971 637 World Bank 
Nov.12, 1973 12 000 World Bank 
Nov.12, 1973 7 200 World Bank 
Dec.11, 1974 19 500 World Bank 
& IDB 
Oct. 4, 1972 16 500 World Bank 
& IDB 
May 26, 1976 65 000 
Oct. 4, 1972 20 000 
May 26, 1976 40 000 
Oct. 4, 1972 20 000 
Aug.20, 1982 13 000 
March 23 2 206 
Nov. 2, 1981 
Feb. 15 1 169 
Sep. 8, 1982 
Nov.12, 1973 5 000 
Apr. 6, 1976 7 500 
Sep. 4, 1978 3 000 
Source; The same as Table I. 
a/ Loan conditions vary according to the projects: interest 
rates from 6.5% to 9.25%, term from 10 to 16 years and the grace 
period from 3 to 6 years. 
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TABLE III 
COST ESTIMATES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS 
ON THE CENIBRA PROJECT a/ 
(Unit; USS million) 
Capital Credits Total 
Japan 81 78 159 
in which: OECF b/ (30) - (30) 
Brazil 83 81 164 
Total 164 159 323 
Source: The same as Table I. 
a/ The cellulose project has, at the same time, the Espirito 
Santo project to plant eucalyptus. The total cost was estimated 
at US$1 327 million but the project was delayed due to recession, 
b/ Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. 
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TABLE IV 
COST ESTIMATES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS 
ON THE TUBARÃO STEEL PROJECTS 
(Unit; USS million) 
Capital Credit Export 
finance 
Total 
Japan 167 90 504 761 
Brazil 347 1 201 â/ - 1 548 
Italy 167 — 571 738 
Total 681 1 291 1 075 3 047 
Source; The same as Table I. 






ESTIMATES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS 
THE AMAZON ALUMINUM PROJECT 
(Unit: B i l l i o n Yen) 
Capital Credits Total 
A Japan 












S Subtotal 133.7 312.1 445.8 
A Japan 














E Subtotal 51.4 120.0 171.4 
Total 185.1 432.1 617.2 
Source: The same as Table I. 
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TABLE VI 
COST ESTIMATES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS 
ON THE CERRADO PROJECT 
(Unitt Millipn Yen) 














Total 3 465 10 250 13 715 
Source; The same as Table I. 
â/ Japan International Cooperation Agency. 
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